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Abstract Lying is known to evoke stress and cognitive
load. Both form cues to deception and lead to an increase in
sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity. But in reality,
deceivers stick to the truth most the time and only lie
occasionally. The present study therefore examined in an
interactive suspect interview setting, whether deceivers still
have clearly diverging cognitive and emotional processes
from truth tellers when only having the intention to lie
incidentally. We found that deceivers who lied constantly
diverge from truth tellers in SNS activity, self-reported
cognitive load and stress. Across all interviews, SNS
activity correlated stronger with self-reports of cognitive
load than stress, which supports the cognitive load
approach. Furthermore, deceivers who told the truth and
lied on only one crucial question, particularly diverged in
self-reported stress from truth-tellers. In terms of SNS
activity and self-reported cognitive load, no differences
were found. Theoretical and practical implications are
discussed.
Keywords Deception  Suspect interview  Sympathetic
nervous system activity  Electrodermal activity  Stress 
Cognitive load
Introduction
Previous studies showed that lying evokes more stress and is
cognitively more challenging than truth telling (Caso et al.
2005), and that these responses in turn increases physiolog-
ical arousal (Jung and Lee 2012). Therefore, lying may
activate both cognitive as well as emotional cues that can be
used for deception detection (DePaulo et al. 2003). For
example, studies reveal that people show higher sympathetic
nervous system (SNS) activity when lying than when telling
the truth (Vincent and Furedy 1992; Zuckerman et al. 1981).
However, the crucial point of successfully deceiving others
is to control the information one is telling in order to create a
false belief (Vrij 2008). The operations to create a false belief
therefore do not necessarily have to involve constant and
explicit fabrications (Sip et al. 2008). For deception to take
place, lying is often not even necessary. Deception may take
a variety of forms, including half-truths, vagueness, equiv-
ocations, and concealments (Carlson et al. 2004). In fact, in
natural situations deceivers stick to the truth as close as
possible, and when they do mislead they seldom fabricate
information but base deceptive accounts on previous expe-
riences (Leins et al. 2013; Stro¨mwall and Wille´n 2011).
Truth telling with the intention to lie thus makes up a great
part of real-life deceptive attempts. This raises the question
whether deceivers still have clearly diverging emotional and
cognitive processes from truth tellers when only lying inci-
dentally. The key question therefore may not be whether
differences in cognitive and emotional load—and its reflec-
tion in the SNS activity (e.g., Ferna´ndez et al. 2012)—can be
measured depending on whether a specific statement is
truthful or not. The question rather should be whether cues to
deception already can be measured during the mere intention
to deceive—the crucial factor underlying deception (Ambach
et al. 2008). The present study addresses this question by
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comparing interviews based on, respectively, fully deceptive
and fully truthful accounts, with accounts wherein people
largely tell the truth but have the aim to lie on crucial moments.
Specifically, we tested in an interactive interview setting
whether, compared to lying and truth telling, the intention to
lie already increases self-reported stress levels and cognitive
demands as well as physiological responses.
Processes Underlying Deception
Past work on deception processes demonstrated that lying is
often accompanied by both increased stress levels and
increased cognitive demand. Cognitive load is often higher
during lying than during truth telling, because liars have to
engage in more cognitive tasks when lying (Vrij 2008).
Examples of such tasks are suppressing the truth while
coming up with a plausible alternative statement (Spence
et al. 2001; Vrij 2008), inferring what the other is thinking,
‘keeping one’s story straight’ and monitoring and controlling
one’s own behavior to avoid creating the impression of lying
(Vrij et al. 2006a). Self-report studies indeed show that liars
not just feel more nervous, less relaxed and calm than truth
tellers but also find the task more strenuous, report being
more concentrated, and indicate to monitor their non-verbal
behavior more than truth tellers (Hartwig et al. 2007;
Stro¨mwall et al. 2006; Watson and Sinha 1993).
The trend in more recent deception literature is to focus on
cognitive cues above emotional cues in order to better distin-
guish deceivers from truth tellers (Vrij et al. 2006a). The
advantage of focusing on cognitive cues is that increased levels
of cognitive load may exclusively be present during deception,
whereas, in most interview settings, stress and tension may be
present during lying as well as truth telling (US National
Research Council 2003; Vrij 2008). Therefore, emotional
indicators may be less reliable cues for detecting deception
than cognitive cues (Vrij et al. 2006a). Still, the notion that
lying increases cognitive load was until now only supported by
interview and free-recall studies in which participants either
had to give fully deceptive or fully truthful accounts (Leal and
Vrij 2008; Leal et al. 2008; Vrij et al. 2006b, 2012). Consid-
ering that in real-life situations, deceivers carefully mix truth
and lies, it is important to validate the cognitive load approach
in an interview setting, wherein deceivers most of the time
stick to the truth and only lie incidentally.
Processes Potentially Underlying the Intention
to Deceive
Arguably, both cognitive and emotional load are not just
higher during the act of lying, but already during the mere
intention to deceive. That is, several mental processes
associated with lying are likely to be active during the
entire deceptive attempt, including when telling the truth
with the intention to deceive. People for example can be
nervous to mislead the other person, or be afraid that their
attempt to deceive will be discovered (Vrij 2008), even
when no lie has been told yet. But also cognitive processes,
not directly related to literally lying, may play a role. For
instance, deceivers continuously attempt to control their
behavior to appear honest and avoid giving away cues to
deception (Buller and Burgoon 1996). Such a motivation
can already be present when having the mere intention to
deceive but not lying yet. In addition, people with an
intention to lie need to monitor the conversation more
closely because they constantly have to decide whether
they can tell the truth or should lie. This may be especially
important when switching from truth telling towards lying,
because during lying deceivers are even more aware that
the observer pays attention to their behavior (Buller and
Burgoon 1996). Because managing these processes
involves cognitive effort, we predict that the mere intention
to deceive already increases cognitive load.
Testing the Intention to Deceive in an Interactive
Interview Setting
Previous experimental studies showed that, compared to
truth telling, the physiological response—measured with
electrodermal activity (EDA)—already is higher during
truth telling with the intention to lie and that the switch
from intention to lie toward lying evoked a peak in SNS
activity (Stro¨fer et al. 2015). However, a disadvantage of
physiological processes is that it remains unclear whether
increased SNS activity may be due to increased cognitive
load, emotional stress, or both (Zuckerman et al. 1981). In
the present work we therefore also included self-report
measures aimed at making a distinction between how
deceivers subjectively experience cognitive load and
emotional stress during truth telling with the intention to lie
compared to consistent lying or consistent truth-telling.
So far, studies looking at processes underlying deception
in interview studies did not combine self-reports with
physiological measures (Caso et al. 2005; Vrij et al. 2006b).
Moreover, previous interview and free-recall studies sur-
rounding deception did not focus on more realistic decep-
tions wherein deceivers tell the truth most the time but have
the intention to lie on crucial moments. Those studies which
did investigate the physiology of deception were of a more
experimental nature, having participants responding to
(often unrelated) questions, prompted on a computer screen
where they either lied or told the truth on specific trials or in
blocks of questions (Dionisio et al. 2001; Ganis et al. 2003;
Stro¨fer et al. 2015).
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Deception, however, is inherently an interactive process
of which person-to-person communication is a fundamental
part. In real interrogations for example, police officers
determine the number and type of questions, ask follow-up
questions and demand elaborations and clarifications
(Hartwig et al. 2004). For instance, deception in an inter-
active setting requires deceivers to be prepared for (unex-
pected) questions and monitor the other person’s reactions.
Together with keeping the dialogue running, this should
reveal more natural cues to deception (Miller and Stiff
1993). According to Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) Inter-
personal Deception Theory, face-to-face interactions force
deceivers to process several tasks simultaneously: For
instance, impression management on verbal and non-verbal
behavior, and attending their conversation partner to check
whether they were believed and managing their emotions
while keeping the conversation smoothly. Hence,
researchers must come up with designs that mirror inter-
active processes at play in real-life interviews (Granhag
and Hartwig 2008). The current study adds to the literature
by answering this call and testing our hypotheses in such an
interactive interview setting.
The Current Study
The aim of the current study was to examine underlying
cognitive and emotional load processes during deception
when the deceiver has the intention to deceive but only lies
incidentally. To do this we created a paradigm, in which
deceivers for a great part were required to stick to the truth
and we assessed their responses by combining self-reports
with a physiological measure. As cover story for the pre-
sent study served the testing of an ostensible newly
developed assessment center test (ACT; Sackett and Dre-
her 1982). The ACT contained an assignment in which
participants had to solve several tasks. In one of the tasks
participants were enticed to sign a document which could
be seen as fraud. Hereby, a situation was created in which
committing a transgression within the ACT was the par-
ticipant’s own decision and responsibility. We then inter-
viewed participants about this transgression. The study was
based on three veracity conditions: In the intention condi-
tion, participants were advised that the best strategy to
approach the interview would be to tell the truth on all
questions but to lie about signing the document—a ques-
tion appearing at the end of the standardized interview. We
in addition created a lie condition wherein participants lied
on all questions, and contrasted the intention and lie con-
ditions with a truth condition wherein participants consis-
tently told the truth.
The interview had the same structure as police inter-
views that build up with the aim to determine whether a
suspect is lying or not (Horvath et al. 1994). As such, the
interview followed a prescribed script with standard
questions. It started broadly, and became continuously
more specific regarding the transgression and disclosed the
evidence against the participant not until late in the inter-
view (Hartwig 2005; Hartwig et al. 2006). We employed an
information gathering interview style, a method based upon
rapport and respect, in which interviewers request suspects
to give detailed statements about their activities through
open questions (Kelly et al. 2013; Vrij et al. 2007).
During the interview we measured the physiological
response of the sympathetic nervous system in form of
electrodermal activity (EDA). EDA is an indicator for
stress and cognitive load (Engstro¨m et al. 2005; Heereman
and Walla 2011; Hout et al. 2000; Nourbakhsh et al. 2012;
Page and Robson 2007; Peter Bankart and Elliott 1974; Shi
et al. 2007; Wilson 2002) and forms the most frequently
used physiological measure by scholars and practitioners in
the field of deception (Vrij 2000). EDA has several
advantages over other physiological measures: It directly
reflects SNS activity and can be measured unobtrusively
within one measurement (Boucsein 2012; Dawson et al.
2007; Wallin 1981).
Moreover, participants’ subjectively experienced cog-
nitive and emotional load during the interview was asses-
sed with self-reports. We took the self-reports directly after
the interview, because concurrent assessments during the
interview could be obtrusive and influence the behavior
under investigation (Kazdin 1979). Also, research has
shown that momentary emotion experiences correlate
highly with recall-based ratings of emotions (Barrett 1997).
Hypotheses
In line with earlier studies examining cognitive load during
lying (Caso et al. 2005; Vrij et al. 2006b), we expected that
the self-reported cognitive load would be higher in the lie
compared to the truth condition (Hypothesis 1a). In the lie
condition, participants continuously had to make up a false
story and come up with deceptive answers. The content of
the questions was related, which meant that the deceptive
answers had to form a coherent story which should be
easier in the truth than in the deception condition, because
the truth comes to mind automatically (Walczyk et al.
2003, 2005).
Similarly, we expected self-reported stress to be higher
in the lie than in the truth condition (Hypothesis 1b).
Participants should be more nervous during lying, both,
because they are afraid of not being believed or being
excited to mislead the interviewer (a money price was
promised to the three best interviewees). Since both, stress
and cognitive load lead to an increase in EDA (Engstro¨m
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et al. 2005; Heereman and Walla 2011; Hout et al. 2000;
Nourbakhsh et al. 2012; Page and Robson 2007; Peter
Bankart and Elliott 1974; Shi et al. 2007; Wilson 2002), we
expect EDA to be higher during the lie compared to the
truth condition (Hypothesis 1c).
In consideration of that deceivers only lie incidentally in
an attempt to deceive, we additionally wanted to test
whether the mere intention to lie can be differentiated on
self-reported cognitive load, stress and/or physiological
responses from truth telling. Theoretically, there are rea-
sons to assume that both, cognitive load and stress are
already increased at the foresight of lying. During truth
telling with the intention to lie, participants have to decide
whether to lie or not, prepare to lie, monitor oneself, the
other and their story. They also could experience stress
before the actual lie takes place (Stro¨fer et al. 2015). The
more the participants progress through the interview, the
more the questions are related to the relevant question ‘Is
this your signature?’ (which was the question revealing the
evidence). It therefore could be expected that nervousness
already increases at these questions, because of the antic-
ipation of the relevant question. Therefore, we expected
both self-reported cognitive load and stress to be higher in
the intention than in the truth condition (Hypothesis 2a and
2b).
In line with these assumptions and previous findings
(Stro¨fer et al. 2015), we expected that truth telling with the
intention to lie evokes higher EDA than ‘honest’ truth
telling in the truth condition (Hypothesis 2c). Above that,
cognitive load and stress caused by preparing to lie should
become most taxing when switching from truth telling to
actual lying. We therefore expected that switching from the
truth telling toward lying in the intention condition would
induce a higher EDA response than switching to the same
question in the other two conditions (Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants
We conducted an experiment with 85 graduate students
participating in exchange for course credit. Participants
randomly were allocated to a veracity condition (Truth,
Lie, Intention). Nineteen participants refused to sign the
document that served as basis for the experiment and
therefore were excluded from the experiment. The data of
three participants who did not follow the instructions of the
experiment were removed as well, leaving 63 participants
for statistical analyses of the self-report data. Participants
sometimes inadvertently skipped a self-report question. For
this reason, the degrees of freedom reported in the results
section sometimes differ between analyses.
Due to technical failures we failed to record EDA data
for 7 participants, therefore analyses for physiological
responses are based on 56 participants which were equally
distributed across conditions (Truth condition: n = 19,
mean age = 20.37, SD = 2.41, range 19–29 years; 12
women; Lie condition: n = 18, mean age = 20.88,
SD = 2.47, range 18–27 years; 13 women; Intention con-
dition: n = 19, mean age = 20.89, SD = 2.87, range
18–28 years; 13 women). Participants provided written
informed consent, and the institutional review board
approved the experimental protocol.
Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of a 3 (veracity condition: truth,
lie or intention) 9 8 (question type: 1–8) mixed design1
Veracity condition was a between subject-factor to which
participants were randomly assigned, and question type a
within-subject factor. We assessed phasic and tonic elec-
trodermal activity, and self-reported stress and cognitive
load as dependent variables.
Procedure
Participants ostensibly took part as test person for a newly
developed assessment center test (ACT; Sackett and Dre-
her 1982). We informed participants that the purpose of the
study was to test a new version of a newly developed
assessment center test (ACT) for which we needed vol-
unteers. We also emphasized the advantages of partici-
pating: gaining experience in doing an ACT and being in
the run for a cash prize awarded to the three best per-
forming participants. We used this cover story to create the
opportunity of deception in a more realistic situation. At
the start of the experiment we explained participants that
the ACT consisted of several exercises and that the three
best participants completing these exercises each would
win 50 €. In reality, the money was allotted among the
participants after the experiment. We further explained that
all tasks of the session were relevant for the price and that
we would clearly state when the experiment was finished. On
average, the experimental sessions lasted for 1.5 hours.2
Each session was run by an experiment leader and two
1 The original design also contained the number of interviewers as an
additional between-subject factor. In half of the interviews a second
interviewer was present while merely making notes and actively
participating in the interview. Analyses with this factor did not render
any significant main or interaction effects. We therefore eliminated
number of interviewers from further analyses.
2 Not all parts of the experiment eventually were used for the article.
In the experiment participants also filled in a personality question-
naire right at the beginning and did a Stroop-task after the interview.
Both data was not used in this article.
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confederates: one acting as ‘experiment assistant’ and the
other as ‘interviewer’.
Participants were debriefed by e-mail after all study-
sessions were conducted. We highlighted that the prize
money was used to increase motivation to participate in the
study. Also, we explained that EDA measurements only
can be interpreted on group level and are not indicative for
individual performance, and that we therefore randomly
allotted the price money among all participants. Further-
more, participants received feedback on their performance
on the in-basket task, which often forms a real part of
modern ACT but in our case only served as cover story.
In-basket Exercise
The experiment started with an in-basket exercise, which
often is part of an assessment center test (Dukerich et al.
1990). Participants were invited to assume the role of a
manager of a transport company and to substitute a regular
employee who currently was on sick leave. Participants
were required to complete four tasks normally executed by
the sick employee in 15 min. In the third task participants
read a contract that had to be signed by the sick
employee—as was indicated by the name of the employee
that was already printed on the contract. A note explained
that the contract was important for the company and had to
be signed urgently. Most of the participants (79 %) signed
the contract, since this is an easy and fast solvable problem,
and continued with the fourth task. However, signing a
document under a wrong name is legally not allowed. This
transgression served as input for our deception experiment.
Participants sometimes hesitated to sign the document. In
this case the investigator attempted to convince the par-
ticipant to sign the document directly after the ACT task by
telling that he himself would sign the document, because
this would increase the chance of the money price. Par-
ticipants (n = 19) who after this reminder continued
resisting signing the document were excluded from the
experiment.
EDA Baseline Measurement and Confrontation
After finishing the in-basket exercise, participants were
brought to the interview room. In order to get an EDA
baseline measure, skin conductance sensors were attached
to the participants and we asked them to sit down 5 min
and relax and wait for the next task of the experiment. We
informed participants that this measure assessed the diffi-
culty of the in-basket test.
After 5 min the experiment leader entered the room again,
stating that she reviewed the participant’s output of the in-
basket tasks, but that a problem occurred regarding one of the
documents. The experiment leader then confronted the
participant with the fact that (s)he signed a document (s)he
was legally not allowed to sign, and informed that (s)he
therefore would be interviewed about this incident.
Experimental Manipulation
Directly after confronting participants with their transgression
participants received a letter advising on the best approach to
behave in the upcoming interview about the transgression.
This letter formed the experimental manipulation consisting
of three veracity conditions: a truth, a lie and an intention to lie
condition. In the truth condition, the letter advised participants
to tell the truth on all questions, including questions about
whether one signed the document. In the lie condition, the
letter advised to lie on all questions, including questions about
whether one signed the document. Finally, in the intention
condition, the letter advised to tell the truth on all questions but
to lie on questions whether one signed the document. We also
highlighted the question regarding the signature in the truth
and lie condition to prevent that the question about the sig-
nature would get special meaning in the intention condition
only. Hereby we aimed to prevent differences in prospective
memory demands between conditions. Finally, we reminded
participants that how well they followed the advice would
affect their chances for the price money.
Interview and Follow-Up Questionnaire
After the participant finished reading the letter the exper-
iment leader left and the interviewer entered the room. The
interview was fully standardized, with the interviewer
asking a total of 10 questions in a fixed order (see Table 1).
Furthermore, the interviewer was trained to behave simi-
larly in each interview and to ask each question using a
neutral intonation. Each interview started with a number of
general questions and worked its way up to the key ques-
tion revealing the evidence: ‘Is this your signature on this
document?’ (Question 8). Thereafter the interview ended
with two closing questions. During the interview, partici-
pants’ EDA was recorded. After the interview the experi-
ment leader entered the room again and asked participants
to fill in a final questionnaire assessing their self-reported




We assessed cognitive load with a scale, consisting of 5 items,
a = 0.84. Two items, ‘How difficult was the interview?’ and
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‘To what extent did you had to concentrate during the inter-
view?’ were based on items used in a study by Cierniak,
Scheiter, and Gerjets (2009). The other three items, ‘How
much mental effort did the interview require?’, ‘To what
degree the interview was mentally demanding?’ and ‘To what
extent did you had to think about the answer of the questions?’
were based on items used in a study by Caso et al. (2005).
Participants answered these questions on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (very little) to 5 (very much). We created a
cognitive load score by aggregating the scores on these 5
items. An explorative factor analysis on these five items
(method: maximum likelihood, based on Eigenvalues greater
than 1) revealed one underlying factor, explaining 62.82 % of
the variance.
Stress
Stress was measured with four items,a = 0.88, derived from
the Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al. 1983). We adjusted
the items to the interview situation in our study. The items
were ‘To which extent did you feel upset during, or directly
after the interview?’, ‘To which extent did you feel nervous
during, or directly after the interview?’, ‘To which extent did
you feel that the stress during, or directly after, the interview
increased to such high levels that you could not let go of it?’
and ‘To which extent did you feel tension during, or directly
after the interview?’ (e.g., Giebels and Janssen 2005). All
items were measured on 7-point Likert scales ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent). We created a stress score
by aggregating the scores on these 4 items. An explorative
factor analysis on these four items (method: maximum
likelihood, based on Eigenvalues greater than 1) revealed
one underlying factor, explaining 73.49 % of the variance.
Skin Conductance
Recording EDA
EDA was recorded at 256 Hz and down-sampled to 16 Hz.
EDA was measured exodermal (constant voltage) via skin
conductance using skin conductance sensors (Thought
Technology Ltd., Montreal West, Quebec, Canada), attached
to the distal phalanx of the right index and ring fingers
(Boucsein 2012). The signal was amplified using Pro-
CompInifiniti amplifier (Thought Technology Ltd.) and was
recorded in lS. We informed participants that they were not
allowed to take any substances which might affect EDA
(such as coffee) either shortly before or during the EDA
measurement.
Range Correction
Preliminary analyses of the data showed high between-
subject variation on tonic EDA recordings due to differ-
ences in interview length. To adjust for the inter-individual
variance in EDA, we applied a range correction by cor-
recting every recorded data point into proportion (between
0 and 1) to the intra-individual range, using a person’s
recorded EDA maximum and minimum (Lykken et al.
1966). To assess participants’ maximum and minimum
values we used the recorded data from the baseline through
the accusation till the interview end. Since phasic EDA is
not time dependent, analyses for phasic EDA were based
on the raw data. Our reported descriptive statistics were
based on raw data for both, tonic as well as phasic EDA (in
lS).
Table 1 Interview questions
Question Content
1 Can you tell me about your link with the university? How often and why are you here?
What exactly are you doing here?
2 Why did you come to University today?
3 Can you describe step by step what you have done after your entry?
4 Did you encounter other people? Who?
5 Can you describe other additional information?
6 Did you participate in an assessment center test?
7 Have you seen this document before?
8 Is this your signature?
9 Do you want to add something?
10 Was everything clear?
The interview consisted of 10 questions. Questions 9 and 10 were not included in the statistical analyses,
since these form the closing part of the interview and were contently not relevant for our experimental
manipulation
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Tonic and Phasic EDA
EDA measured over a period of time consists of a slowly
drifting tonic signal, which is overlaid by short fluctua-
tions, called skin conductance responses (SCRs or phasic
EDA; seen as sharp peaks; Figner and Murphy 2010). Both
tonic and phasic measures are interesting with regard to the
present study. Tonic EDA can indicate which of our
experimental conditions evoked highest arousal generally
summarized over all individual questions. Phasic EDA on
the other side is more sensitive to abrupt, local, short-living
changes. This makes it suitable to indicate how arousal
changed through the interview between questions (See
Stro¨fer et al. 2015 for a similar argument).
Continuous Decomposition Analysis (CDA)
In order to extract the phasic and tonic data from the raw
EDA data, we executed a Continuous Decomposition
Analysis using Ledalab (Benedek and Kaernbach 2010)
which is an algorithm written in MATLAB. We iterated the
parameter optimization three times, which is above the
minimal iteration of two recommended by Benedek and
Kaernbach (2010). This multi-step deconvolution approach
is based upon a physiological model of the SCR shape. The
algorithm has several outputs but most importantly reports
the continuous phasic and tonic component of the signal.
EDA Time Segments
After the CDA analysis we separated the signal into time
segments, based on the interview questions. Each segment
respectively contained the EDA of a question and the
corresponding answer. There is variation in the lengths of
each segment, which also differed between persons. To
compare EDA between segments the average phasic and
tonic EDA activity was calculated for each segment. From
this we subtracted the average phasic and tonic EDA
activity we respectively measured at the baseline.
Results
Self-Reported Cognitive Load and Stress
Our first aim was to assess differences in self-reported
cognitive load and stress between the conditions (see
Fig. 1). To analyze these differences, we conducted two
ANOVAs with veracity condition (intention to lie/lie/truth)
as a between-subject factor on, respectively, self-reported
cognitive load and stress. The results revealed a significant
main effect of veracity condition on cognitive load F(2,
60) = 5.65, p = 0.006, gp
2 = 0.16, as well as stress, F(2,
58) = 6.67, p = 0.002, gp
2 = 0.19. Subsequent simple
effect analyses showed that, in line with our predictions,
participants reported the lie condition (M = 3.65,
SE = 0.17) to be more cognitively demanding than the
truth condition (M = 2.94, SE = 0.17), t(37) = 3.53,
p = 0.005. In the lie condition, self-reported cognitive load
was also significantly higher than in the intention condition
(M = 3.00, SE = 0.15), t(41) = 2.62, p = 0.012, whereas
the intention and truth conditions did not differ signifi-
cantly, t(42) = 0.26, p = 0.794. Similarly, we found that
self-reported stress was significantly higher in the lie
condition (M = 4.26, SE = 0.30) than in the truth condi-
tion (M = 2.80, SE = 0.28), t(36) = 3.62, p = 0.001.
However, self-reported stress was also significantly higher
in the intention than in the truth condition, t(41) = 2.50,
p = 0.017, with no significant difference between the lie
and intention condition (M = 3.78, SE = 0.26),
t(39) = 1.22, p = 0.231. These results revealed that in the
lie condition participants reported the highest levels of
cognitive load as well as stress. For the intention condition,
in turn, the results showed that participants report relative
low levels of cognitive load (comparable to cognitive load
in the truth condition) but still higher levels of stress
(comparable to the lie condition). Thus whereas partici-
pants in the intention to lie condition did not experience the
interview as particularly cognitively demanding, they did
experience elevated emotional stress up to the level of
participants lying consistently.
Physiological Responses Across Interviews for Tonic
EDA
Our second aim was to investigate the course of the
physiological response in SNS activity of someone lying,
telling the truth and telling the truth with the intention to
lie. We focused on question one to eight, which comprises
the questions where participants had to tell the truth (1–7)
and had to lie in the intention condition (8). We conducted
two mixed factorial ANOVAs with veracity condition
(intention to lie/lie/truth) as between-subject factor and
question type (1–8) as within-subject factor on tonic and
phasic EDA.
For tonic EDA, we found a significant main effect of
veracity condition, F(2, 53) = 5.72, p = 0.006, gp
2 = 0.18
and question type, F(7, 371) = 10.91, p\ 0.001,
gp
2 = 0.17. The interaction effect between veracity and
question was not significant, F(14, 371) = 0.84,
p = 0.622, gp
2 = 0.03. Simple effect analyses for the main
effect of veracity condition revealed that tonic EDA was
higher in the lie (M = 3.01, SE = 0.68) than in the truth
condition (M = 1.84, SE = 0.67), t(35) = 1.74,
p = 0.059, although this effect was not significant, and
significantly higher than in the intention condition
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(M = 1.44, SE = 0.67), t(35) = 4.80, p = 0.001. There
was no difference in tonic EDA between the intention and
truth condition, t(36) = 1.30, p = 0.15. The pattern for
tonic EDA therefore is similar to the pattern we found for
self-reported cognitive load.
Simple effect analyses following the main effect of
question type, showed that when moving chronologically
through the interview, tonic EDA significantly rises from
question 1 to 2 t(55) = 2.54, p = 0.013, remains constant
from question 2 to 4, ts(55)\ 1.30, ps[ 0.207, and then
rises again through question 8, ts(55)[ 1.93, ps\ 0.054.
Physiological Responses Across Interviews
for Phasic EDA
In line with the premise that phasic EDA can better dis-
criminate on question level, we found for phasic EDA no
significant main effect of veracity condition, F(2,
53) = 0.48, p = 0.621, gp
2 = 0.018, but a significant main
effect of question type, F(7, 371) = 8.97, p\ 0.001,
gp
2 = 0.145. Subsequent simple effect analyses revealed
that across all three veracity conditions, question 1, 7 and 8
induced the highest peak in EDA. Only on question 8, the
relevant question wherein participants were confronted
with the evidence, the pattern of phasic EDA between the
questions was different within the conditions, which was
supported by a significant interaction effect between con-
dition and question type, F(14, 371) = 2.02, p = 0.015,
gp
2 = 0.071. Phasic EDA showed an increase at question 8
in the intention (M = 0.21, SE = 0.04) and truth condition
(M = 0.21, SE = 0.04) but not in the lie condition
(M = 0.09, SE = 0.04). No significant difference was
found between the truth and intention condition,
t(36) = 0.08, p = 0.933. Phasic EDA was higher in both
than in the lie condition, ts(35)[ 2.43, ps\ 0.035 (see
Fig. 2).
Relationship Between tonic EDA and Self-Reported
Stress and Cognitive Load
Our third goal was to gain more insight into the relation-
ship between the self-reported experiences by participants
and their physiological responses across the interviews. For
this purpose, we took the mean tonic EDA from question
one to eight and correlated these with self-reported stress
and cognitive load. These analyses revealed a significant
correlation between both, tonic EDA and self-reported
cognitive load, r(54) = 0.50, p\ 0.001 but also between
tonic EDA and self-reported stress, r(54) = 0.30,
p = 0.030. In addition, the correlation between tonic EDA
and cognitive load was significantly stronger than that
between tonic EDA and stress, z = 1.962, p = 0.05 (Lee
and Preacher 2013; see also Steiger 1980). This suggests
that the physiological response of the participants was
more strongly related to their subjective experience of how
cognitively demanding than of how stressful they experi-
enced the interview.
When looking at the positive relationship between EDA
and self-reported cognitive load in more detail (see Fig. 3,
panel a) we see that participants of the lie condition formed
a cluster, all scoring high on tonic EDA as well as on self-
reported cognitive load. Such a cluster was not present in
the other two conditions or for the relation between EDA
and stress (see Fig. 3, panel b), where participants showed
more variation on both their physiological as well as self-
reported responses. This suggests that lying affected all













Fig. 1 Mean self-reported
cognitive load and stress (? SE)
for the three veracity condition
(intention to lie, lie, truth).
Cognitive load was measured on
a 5-point Likert scale and stress
on a 7-point Likert scale
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physiological as well subjective experience of cognitive
load during the interview. Truth telling and intention to lie,
however, did not have this effect, resulting in more inter-
individual variation on how they responded to these
measures.
Discussion
The current study investigated cognitive and affective
processes during deception in an interactive interview
setting. We specifically focused on the question whether
Fig. 2 The course of phasic EDA during the interview. Mean phasic
EDA from question 1 to 9 (with standard error in parentheses) for the
lie condition were 0.20 (0.04), 0.13 (0.04), 0.06 (0.03), 0.03 (0.03),
0.06 (0.04), 0.10 (0.03), 0.14 (0.04), 0.09 (0.04) 0.06 (0.03), for the
Intention condition 0.16 (0.04), 0.14 (0.03), 0.12 (0.03), 0.09 (0.03),
0.09 (0.04), 0.08 (0.03), 0.16 (0.04), 0.21 (0.04), 0.08 (0.03) and for
the truth condition 0.14 (0.04), 0.11 (0.03), 0.11 (0.03), 0.11 (0.03),
0.12 (0.04), 0.13 (0.03), 0.19 (0.04), 0.21 (0.04), 0.12 (0.03)
Fig. 3 Relationship between tonic EDA (range corrected) and self-
reports across all interviews. a Relationship between tonic EDA and
self-reported cognitive load (measured on a 5-point Likert scale) and
b relationship between tonic EDA and self-reported stress (measured
on a 7-point Likert scale)
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deceivers still have clearly diverging cognitive and emo-
tional processes from truth tellers when only having the
intention to lie incidentally. In line with the extant litera-
ture, the results showed that participants who consistently
lied on all questions had (although not significant) higher
physiological responses (e.g., Stro¨fer et al., 2015), and also
reported to experience the interview as more stressful and
cognitively demanding, than truth-tellers (e.g., Caso et al.,
2005; Vrij et al. 2006a, b). Participants who were required
to lie incidentally however, only differed on self-reported
stress with truth tellers. Below we will discuss these find-
ings in the light of deception literature, controlled vs. more
realistic interview settings, and processes relevant for the
intention to deceive.
Previous interview studies all focused on the strict
comparison of fully deceptive with fully truthful accounts
(Caso et al., 2005; Vrij et al. 1996, 2006b, 2008, 2011,
2012; Warmelink et al. 2013). When deceiving in real life
though, people most of the time stick to the truth and only
lie incidentally (Leins et al., 2013; Stro¨mwall and Wille´n
2011). The question therefore arises whether more realistic
deceptive attempts, consisting mostly of truth telling and
only a few literal lies, still diverge from fully truthful
accounts in terms of cognitive load and/or stress. In line
with previous research, the current results show that con-
stant lying compared to constant truth telling increases
physiological reactions in EDA, which is known to
increase with cognitive load and stress (Engstro¨m et al.,
2005; Hout et al., 2000; Nourbakhsh et al., 2012; Page and
Robson 2007; Peter Bankart and Elliott 1974; Shi et al.,
2007; Wilson, 2002)—as well as self-reported cognitive
load and stress. We assume that the higher self-reports of
cognitive load in the lie compared to the truth condition
were related to activities directly associated with literally
lying, such as suppressing the truth while making up a
believable story (Spence et al., 2001; Vrij, 2008), whereas
the higher self-reported stress assumable was related to fear
and nervousness of not being believed and/or excitement to
deceive the other (Ekman, 1985; Vrij, 2008). It is generally
assumed that the more deceivers experience stress or
cognitive load, the more likely cues to deception (such as
increased EDA) would occur (Zuckerman et al., 1981), and
the current results further support this notion.
Our main interest however was the intention condition,
which resembled real-life deception—wherein truths and
lies are mixed—much better. Interestingly, the intention
condition could not be differentiated from the truth con-
dition in terms of EDA. Truth telling with and without the
intention to lie evoked an equal physiological response
pattern. Also, we observed a phasic EDA peak on the
relevant question in both conditions (where participants
had to lie in the intention and tell the truth in the truth
condition).
In first instance, these findings are surprising, because in
line with previous work we expected that the mere inten-
tion to lie could already evoke higher EDA (Stro¨fer et al.,
2015). The premise was that mental processes associated
with deception would be active during the whole deceptive
attempt, including the truth telling parts. These could be
stress related—for instance, being nervous in the foresight
of lying (Vrij, 2008)—as well as having a more cognitive
origin—for instance, caused by monitoring oneself, the
other, or preparing to lie (Stro¨fer et al., 2015).
One reason for the similar physiological response pat-
terns when comparing the intention to deceive and truth-
telling may be related to our study design. Differences in
truth telling with and without the intention to deceive may
be too subtle to be detected in interactive scenarios like
ours with interpersonal variability. In our study, no inter-
view was exactly the same as the other, even within con-
ditions. It seems thus that in real-life, truth telling with and
without the intention to deceive can elicit similar respon-
ses, at least on a physiological basis. Another reason for
the similar physiological response patterns between the
intention to lie and truth-telling conditions is not an
absence of these processes in the intention condition. We
rather assume that particularly stress related processes,
present in the intention condition, underlie ‘honest’ truth
telling in a more realistic deception setting as well. Unlike
the critic often ascribed to transgression studies, in the
present study we compared liars with truth tellers who both
transgressed (see for a review DePaulo et al., 2003). Truth
telling in the truth condition therefore perhaps was not a
neutral act, ‘free’ from feelings of stress, which might
explain similar EDA levels during truth telling with and
without the intention to lie. Also, this might explain why
we found an EDA peak in both condition on the relevant
question. Physiological responses to interview questions
are not just influenced by veracity alone, but also by how
disturbing the questions are experienced (Gudjonsson,
1982): Participants in our truth condition therefore may
have had as much stress answering the relevant question
than those whose transgressions remained hidden by the
lie. This would explain why we found a so called automatic
defensive response - a peak in physiological arousal caused
by stimuli perceived as aversive or threatening (Campbell
et al. 1997; Roelofs et al. 2010) - on the relevant question
in both conditions. Truth tellers may have found answering
the question ‘‘Is this your signature?’’ as disturbing as
deceivers in the intention condition (who lied on this
question).
This reasoning matches the fact that whereas previous
work did reveal a difference between truth telling with and
without the intention to lie on EDA (Stro¨fer et al., 2015),
the current study did not find this difference. That is, in the
more experimental studies of Stro¨fer et al. (2015)
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participants did not commit a transgression, questions were
contently unrelated, and neither had personal relevance nor
were embedded in an interactive interview.
Since stress is not unique for people being interviewed
who deceive, but also common for people who tell the
sincere truth, researchers indeed recently argued to focus
on cognitive cues to deception instead (US National
Research Council, 2003; Vrij, 2008). However, previous
research showed that tonic EDA may be sensitive to stress
as well as cognitive load (e.g., Engstro¨m et al., 2005;
Heereman and Walla 2011; Hout et al., 2000; Nourbakhsh
et al., 2012; Page and Robson 2007; Peter Bankart and
Elliott 1974; Shi et al., 2007; Wilson, 2002). In our specific
study context, higher tonic EDA levels seemed to be more
strongly related to self-reported cognitive load than emo-
tional stress. That is, when comparing the experimental
conditions, we find similar patterns for self-reported cog-
nitive load and tonic EDA, whereas the pattern for self-
reported stress differs: cognitive load and EDA were higher
only in the lie condition, while stress was higher in both the
lie and intention condition. Moreover, when comparing the
relation between tonic EDA and self-reported cognitive
load and stress, we found that the correlation was signifi-
cantly stronger than the correlation between tonic EDA and
self-reported stress.
Cognitive load in the lie condition could directly be a
result of suppressing the truth while making up a coun-
terfactual statement (Spence et al., 2001; Vrij, 2008).
Continuously making up a story may further indirectly
affect cognitive load by increasing monitoring behavior,
implanted by the deceiver to avoid creating the impression
of lying (Buller and Burgoon 1996; Vrij, Fisher, et al.,
2006). Previously we reasoned that these latter, indirect
processes may not be unique for constant lying, but may be
active during the intention to deceive as well. However,
having in mind that in the present study the intention and
truth condition neither differed in terms of cognitive load
nor in EDA, we may conclude that whereas consistently
lying is cognitively taxing, having the mere intention to
deceive may not be.
Moreover, deception is about creating a belief in others
which oneself considers to be untrue (Vrij, 2000). How this
belief is created should not matter, because the crucial
factor underlying deception is the intention to deceive
(Ambach et al., 2008) and this intention should be equally
strong for people who consistently are lying and people
with the mere intention to deceive. This is also reflected in
the present study in terms of affective responses, since the
lie and intention conditions were experienced as equally
stressful, although in terms of content they were different.
Thus, in contrast to the findings with respect to cognitive
load, in terms of stress accounts with the intention to
deceive are more similar to accounts wherein people are
consistently lying. Together these results illustrate the
complex nature of cues to deception when deceivers have
the intention to deceive but do not lie yet. That is, whereas
accounts with the intention to deceive on the one hand may
be more similar to truth telling accounts—in both accounts
people largely tell the truth—on the other hand they may
be more similar to deception accounts—in both type of
accounts people have the intention to deceive.
When zooming in on differences in EDA between the
different questions, we found that the moment of the crit-
ical question triggering participants in the intention con-
dition to lie did induce a high phasic EDA peak. In the lie
condition in contrast, phasic EDA showed the opposite
effect concerning the question with the signature, with
decreased phasic EDA on the relevant question (see
Fig. 2). This may be explained by a habituation effect:
Frequent lying makes lying easier and frequent truth telling
(like in reality and resembled in our intention condition)
makes lying more difficult (Hu et al. 2012; Verschuere
et al. 2011). Also, the preceding questions demanded much
more elaborated answers than the relevant question con-
cerning the signature. Therefore, it is imaginable that
participants in the lie condition could have been more
cognitively depleted during the interview and were relieved
at the ‘relatively’ simple Yes/No question: ‘Is this your
signature?’, pointing out the end of the interview.
Although the phasic physiological responses of people
who consistently lied, and people who only lied on the
relevant question were different, both groups did report to
have experienced more stress during the interview than
people who only told the truth. It may be possible that self-
reported stress in the intention condition was caused by the
lie moment itself, whereas in the lie condition stress was
experienced across the whole interview. Future studies
testing theories on deception processes should use para-
digms where truths and lies are mixed to investigate these
processes in more detail. Such paradigms may not just
qualitatively differ in their underlying processes related to
stress and cognitive load; they also reflect real-life inter-
views better than when participants constantly lie.
Limitations and Recommendations
The aim of the present study was to find out whether
deceivers already diverge from truth tellers when merely
have the aim to deceive but do not (have to) lie yet. The
answer is yes: Deceptive accounts, consisting mainly of
truth telling with only one (crucial) lie differed with
truthful ones, but only on self-reported stress and not
cognitive load or physiological responses. This supports
the emotional load approach which aims to distinguish
deceivers and truth tellers by signs of stress, resulting from
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concerns of being detected (Vrij, 2000). However, the
practical gains from the present findings remain restricted
as long as these stress differences cannot be measured
using more unobtrusive measures than self-reports.
Previous studies surrounding the physiology of the
intention to deceive were much more structured (Carrio´n
et al. 2010; Dawson, 1980; Furedy and Ben-Shakhar 1991;
Furedy et al. 1988; Stro¨fer et al., 2015). For the present
study we deliberately chose to embed deception in an
interview setting resembling real-life interviews as closely
as possible. Although this approach increases external
validity, topical interviews (such as in the current study)
bear other complications such as identifying the source of
physiological changes (Cunha et al., 2010). We aimed to
overcome this challenge by testing the relationship
between self-reported stress and cognitive load and tonic
EDA, and found relations between those measures. It
remains however difficult to identify the source of physi-
ological changes on question level (local phasic EDA
changes) since they cannot be related to self-reports con-
cerning the whole interview.
With regard to further validate the cognitive load
approach we encourage future studies to increase the
reality of the scenarios against the approach is tested. The
current study only found support for the cognitive load
approach for fully deceptive accounts. Our findings do not
imply that in real-life scenarios where truth and lies are
mixed, cognitive load could not play a role at all. In real
life, deceivers strategically choose themselves when to lie
and when not in a deceptive attempt. This factor could be
cognitively demanding, because deceivers have to think
when it makes sense to lie. To investigate this, we advise to
further develop the paradigm and make it even more
realistic. Participants could for instance be given a choice
when to lie and when to tell the truth to build up a coherent
deceptive story (Sip et al., 2008). Building in factors like
‘free will’ when to lie could make a deceptive attempt
cognitively more demanding, even if the truth is told most
of the time.
In conclusion, previous deception research mainly
focused on finding cues to deception by investigating
accounts wherein deceivers are lying consistently.
Although, these studies revealed important information on
which cues to deception may be useful for deception
detection in real-life, they have an important limitation: in
real deceptive accounts people almost never consistently
lie but stick to the truth as much as possible and only lie on
relevant moments in the conversation. The current research
shows that the psychological processes during such an
intention to lie on the one hand may be similar to processes
during lying itself: both create an intention to deceive
others which may result in elevated stress levels. On the
other hand, processes during accounts with the intention to
lie were more similar to truth-telling accounts since both
resulted in lower cognitive load than fully deceptive
accounts. To discovering cues to deception in real-life
conversations, research therefore should focus on both
emotional and cognitive indicators of deception.
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